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December 1984Considerable public resources in both high and low-income countries
are devoted to  the subsidization of  fertility control and health investments.
The effects of these programs are  thus of  some concern, and social  scien-
tists have devoted attention to  the evaluation of these programs.  Most
evaluation  studies  (e.g., Hermalin  (1972),  Khan and Sirageldin  (1979),
Rosenzweig and  Schultz  (1981),  Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1982))  have
essentially compared  the variation in measures of the intensity of pro-
ram  effort  across  localities  with  the  corresponding  inter-area  variation
in  fertility  and  health.  Little  or  no  attention has been paid  to  the
causes  of  the  cross-area  variability  in the levels of such programs.
Yet,  if  the  allocation  of  public  health  and  family  planning  services or
subventions  across  localities  is  systematically  related  to  factors
determining  fertility and health outcomes that are known to  subsidy pro-
viders but unobserved by researchers, such cross-sectional estimates
will produce misleading  conclusions  about program effectiveness.
Interest has  grown recently in  incorporating endogenous public resource
allocations within models concerned with private  agent behavior.  Empirical
applications or  tests of  such models, however, have been scarce and have
been principally concentrated in  the area of agricultural policy (Guttman
(1978), Huffman and Miranowski  (1981),  Huffman and McNulty  (forthcoming)).
Moreover,  existing general economic theories of  public allocations do not
provide much guidance for  predicting how publicly-financed  human capital
subsidies and,  in particular, "family planning" subsidies are distributed
among heterogenous recipients.  Altruism theories of public transfers
(Hochman and Rodgers  (1969),  Roberts  (1984)) would appear  to  suggest
that  the least-endowed receive the highest transfers, but such modelsprovide no  rationale for  the use of  subsidies  to  particular goods such
as contraceptives.  Pressure-group theory (Becker  (1982)) suggests  that
groups that are (i) relatively small  in number,  (ii)  have and can command
resources for lobbying and  (iii) derive the greatest benefits from public
transfers or interventions will receive  the highest  transfers.  This model
would appear  to  imply  that  the rich--small  in number and with greater
resources--rather  than the poor would receive  the highest fertility control
subsidies,  since, assuming that  the poor have  the largest families  and  face
the same prices,they avert  less births than the rich and thus benefit  least
from subsidies to  fertility control.
While  the  existence of externalities from health (infection) might
provide a Pigovian  (and pressure-group) rationale for  the  subvention of
health investments among the low-health poor, the empirical and theoretical
rationale for fertility control subsidization based  on the existence of
direct  population externalities  is less  clear  (Eckstein and Wolpin (1984)).
Moreover,  since a birth from any source contributes equally to  population
growth, the  existence of population externalities  (e.g.,  congestion) does
not obviously provide a basis  for  selective  subsidization of  households
by income  or human capital endowments.  A model of health and family
planning  subsidies  is needed.
In this paper we formulate and  test an optimizing model deter-
mining the distribution of  family planning and  health subsidies across
heterogenous households and  assess the biases in cross-area estimates of
the health effects of  such subsidies due to public resource optimization.
The model incorporates different features of the general theories of
public allocations:  the welfare of  "donor" households is  directlybut  asymmetrically affected by the  behavior of  recipient households, as
in altruism models;  thus, recipients of  subventions have an intrinsic
advantage  in obtaining resource transfers, as  implied by competitive
interest  group models, but  the distribution of  subsidies is  a function
of price effects as well as recipient  characteristics, as in optimal
taxation models.  The model  is used to derive rules for  the distribution
of  both  health  and  fertility  control  subsidies  and  to  discern  the  con-
ditions under which subsidies to  fertility control  alone or  in  combination
with health subsidies are optimal  (Pareto-improving),  without resort to
arbitrary specifications of population externalities or  altruistic concern
for  family  size.
In  section  1, the  model  is  set  out.  It  is  shown  that  when  there  is
a health externality, subsidization of  fertility control can substitute
pervasively  for  a  health  subsidy  if  and  only  if  family  size  and  health  are
gross substitutes.  It  is  then shown that when only family planning subsidies
are provided,  such subsidies are likely  to be distributed disproportionately
to  low-health households, resulting in underestimation of  the health
effects  of  family planning programs  from cross-section data.  In the  next
section,  it  is  demonstrated  that  a  combination  of  family  planning  and
health  subsidies  are  Pareto-improving  in  the  presence  of  the  health  ex-
ternality even when cross-price effects and  fertility  externalities
are absent.  It  is  then shown that  the distribution of  the two  subsidies
will be positively correlated across  areas  (even in the absence of admini-
strative scale economics),  but  it  is impossible  to establish whether  such
subsidies, when jointly provided, will favor the least or most endowed
of recipient  households.In  section 2, longitudinal data describing child health and publicly-
provided  family planning and  health programs in 20 barrios in Laguna
Province  in the Philippines  are used  to  estimate the effects  of  such pro-
grams on child health and  the relationships between the distribution of
the programs and pre-program health levels,  i.e.,  the governmental
allocation rules.  The results are consistent with the model:  (i)  dates
of  family planning and  health program initiation across barrios are posi-
tively correlated,  (ii)  family size and health are gross  substitutes among
households and  in  some barrios family planning programs but not health
programs are present;  (iii) both programs were initiated earliest in the
low-health barrios and  (iv)  as a consequence, the positive and significant
child  health effects of  both the family planning and  health programs are
completely obscured when no account  is  taken of  the systematic associations
between program placement and  areal health endowments.5
1.  Modeling the Distribution of Health and  Family Planning Subsidies
a.  Evaluating Subsidy Effects on Health Production Among Hetero-
geneous Households
Consider a set  of T low-income households each residing in a dif-
ferent health environment.  Each household  i chooses a level  of health for
its children Hi,  its family size Ni  and  its consumption Z  solving the
following problem:
i  i  i  i
(1)  maxU  = U  (H ,  N,  Z),
where  health production  is described by the  function
(2)  H  =  h(X,  N  )  +  p  h  > 0,hx , h  <0, x  xx  NN
subject  to  the  full  income  constraint
(3)  F i  i  i  i  ii  i
(3)  F  pNN  +  (P, - )  (V  - N  )  + (px  - )X  N  +  P
i  i
where X  per-child  health input,  =  exogenous, health parameter or
i  i
endowment,  F  =  full  income net  of  taxes, if  any;  V  =  potential  fertility  in
the absence of  fertility control;  pK  =  price of good K, K =  N, X, Z;
p  =  cost  of  fertility control or averted births,  and s  and  s  are per-
c  c  x
unit subsidies  to  fertility control and health  inputs, respectively, pro-
2
vided  in  each  health  environment  by  a  central  "government"  or  donor.
The  solution for each household's average per-child health net of  the
environmental effect  in terms of  the exogenous variables unique  to  it  is6
i  i  i  i  i
(4)  H  =H(s,  s,  F  ,  ).
x  c
Estimation of  (4) to  obtain the average effect  of  the subsidy s. on child
health when  i  is unobserved yields  the estimate:
i  i  i  ds dH  i  dX  i  dN1   1
(5)  = h  +  hN  i  =  x, c,
ds.  ds.  ds.  dp
The true  effect of  a change in the subsidy s. on the health outcome is
given by the  first two  terms in (5):  the subsidy  (price) effects on the
health input provided  to each child and on family size weighted by their respective
marginal health effects,  from  (2).  The  third term in  (5) is  the bias which
arises when the  i  are unobserved by the researcher and vary with the  sub-
sidy rates.  Only  if  the  subsidies  are distributed independently of the
i
p ,  or,  more  generally,  of  any  of  the  parameters  unique  to  each  ares which
influence health investments, will the association between the subsidies
and health net of  observed variables  provide unbiased estimates of subsidy
effects.
The  sign  of  the  bias  in  (5)  will  obviously  depend  on  the  allocation
rules used by the  agents who distribute  the subsidies.  If  such agents
follow a compensatory rule,  for example, providing higher  subsidies to
less-endowed areas, then the  subsidy effects obtained  from (4) estimated,
say, by least  squares will understate the  true consequences of  increasing
the subsidy for  any randomly-chosen household;  if  such subsidies go  to
the better-endowed, their effect will be overestimated.Consideration of
the possibly systematic  association between subsidies provided to  agents
and  the environmental  or other characteristics  of  the agents in the esti-
mation of  subsidy effects clearly yields better  (policy-relevant) estimates
of  those effects.  Moreover, such estimates also permit the testing of modelsof  governmental  resource  allocations,  which  should  provide  the  rules  by
which  public  resources  are  distributed  among  heterogenous  agents  or
localities,  as  well  as  a  rationale  for  the  particular  set  of  instruments
used  to  effect  resource  transfers.
b.  The  Optimality  of  Family  Planning  Subsidies  and  their  Distribution
To  discern  the  rules  by  which  subsidies  to  fertility  control  might
be  distributed  among  households  behaving  as  described  above  in  the
absence  of  any  arbitrarily-assumed  direct  population  externality,
consider  a  wealthyhousehold  having  the  same  objective  function  as  in  (1)
but  facing  a  health  externality.  In  particular,  let  the  technology  of
health  production  for  the well-off  household  be
(6)  H  =  h(X,  N,  H*)  1  ,  h*Y>  0,
where  H*  is  the  mean  health  of  the  children  in  the  T  low-income
households,  i.e.,
T
(7)  H*  =  Z  C  H
i=l
S  T   .
where  a  =  Ni/(  !  N)  and  max  (H i )  <  H.  Thus,  while  the  health  of  the
i=l
well-off  children  depends  on  the  mean  health  of  the  children  of  the  poor,  there
is  no  direct  fertility  externality.  As  in  altruism  models,
the  externality  is  asymmetric--poor  households  do  not  consider  or  are
not  affected  by  the  consumption  set  of  the  "donor"  household.
Assume  that  the  wealthyhousehold  can  observe  all  the  health  endowments
but,  initially,  cannot  subsidize  health  investments  and  cannot  tax  fertility
i
directly  (s  >  0).  If  each  household's  fertility  control  is  differentially
c  -8
subsidized,  the budget constraint  for  the wealthyhousehold  is:
(8)  G = PN  +P  (v  - N)  +P  XN  +  P  Z  +  s1  (1  +  6  ) (  - N  ),
N  c  x  z  c  c i
where G  =  full income of  the high-income household and  8  is the  loss in  sub-
c
sidy transfers to  the ith household  associated with transaction costs
(waste,  graft).  In this setup, the transfer  scheme  is politically
feasible, since the majority of households  (the poor) and possibly all
households are potentially better off.  The questions are:l)  under what
conditions will the wealthy household subsidize fertility control
and  2) how will  the  subsidy, if warranted,be distributed among the poor
households.
Maximization of  the wealthy-household utility function subject  to
(8),  (9)  and  the price-taking behavior of the  poor households,  as described
by model  (1) through  (3),  yields  the equilibrium conditions:
i  i
s  P  Xp  1
c  i  x  NX  HH*  i  c  H  - *
(9)  a   +  c  +  (-  ) ]  -
P  p  HX  i  HN  H* 9  c  c  N  CHX  nip
c
1  -1  \  "l-  i
(  ) 1  (  N)  (1 + e) > 0  i  = 1...T
c  N
i
sc or  --  =  0.
p
where Eq=(aH/3H*) (H*/H)  and  EHX =  (EH/X)  (X/H),  from  (7);  EHX
(Hi/ i X)  (X !Hi)  and £HN =  (3Hi/SNi) (Ni/Hi) from (2);  and  the ni  are
i
the demand  price elasticities characterizing the ith household.Note in  > 0.
Np
Condition  (9)  has  two terms.  The first  contains the health
gains  to  the rich household associated with increasing the fertility
control subsidy.  There are three sources of gains:  the first term in
brackets  is  the  health  return which  occurs  because  of  cross
price  effects.  Raising  the fertility control  subsidy increases healthif  fertility  and  child  health  are  gross  substitutes,  as  Xp  <  0.  The
xc
second term is  the return due  to  the direct or biological  effect  of  family
size  on child health, through (2),  in poor households.  This  term corresponds to a
positive  gain  if  decreases  in  family  size  biologically  augment  child  health.
The third bracketed  term is the  "eradication" effect of  fertility control
subsidies--decreases in the size of  families with below-average child
health (Hi  <  H*) increase  the mean health of  the poor households;  family
planning subsidies provided  to  the lowest-health households  thus  increase
the health of  the wealthy households  via the health externality even  if
fertility and  child health are independent  (in terms of  price or biological
effects)  in poor households.
The  second term in condition (9) is  the marginal  cost  incurred by
the wealthy from increasing the  fertility control subsidy to household i.
Such costs are higher the  greater  the  number of averted births  (the lower
is  fertility),  the smaller  the own price elasticity of  fertility,  and the
higher are  transaction costs.
Condition (9) indicates that  fertility control  subsidies can be used
as  substitutes for  health subsidies for  all poor  households when there  is a health
but not  a population externality and even when no biological relationship exists
between fertility and child health,  as  long as  the  fertility control cross-
price elasticity  for health is  sufficiently strong and negative;  i.e.,  fertility
and health are gross  substitutes.  Condition (9) also suggests
that, given the optimality of  fertility control  subsidization, the lowest-
health (eradication effect)  and the highest-fertility
(cost effect) households would receive10
the  largest  family  planning  subsidies.  However,  this  does  not  imply
that  those households with the lowest health endowments receive  the
highest  subsidies.  Indeed,  the  distributional  rules  will  depend  on  price
effects.  To  see  this,  consider  the  effect  on  the  subsidy  rate  to  the
ith household when that  household experiences an increase in  its health
endowment  i  and  adjusts  its  behavior  accordingly.  For  simplicity,
assume  that  the  ith household's  health  is  (initially)  at  the  mean  of  the
health distribution  of  poor  households,  i.e.,  Hi  - H*  =  0.  Total  differ-
entiation  of  the  system  of  first-order  conditions  describing  the  wealthy-
household  allocations,  treating  price  effects  as  parameters,  yields:
i
ds  pN  i  i  (pN
0)  c  xN   i  (1  - )  dX  dN  iPx N   i
(10)  =  [(h  h  (  )  - 1)  (--)  - a  h
d  h  x  i  dp  1  h  xx
dv  x  EN  c  dl  x
i  i i  i  ds  pN  i  dsi
dX  dX  C  x  i  1  dN  c (-)  (  )]  (  -)  +  [  a  - s  [  )]
dp,  1  Ic  +h  c  i  dG
c  d  d8  x  dp
Expression  (10)  has  two  terms,  the  first  corresponding  to  the  (com-
pensated)  own  price  or  cost  effect  of  the  ith  subsidy  and  the  second
associated
corresponding  to  the/income  effect  on  the  wealthy  household.  The  magnitudes
of  these  terms  depend  in  turn  on  the  magnitudesand  signs  of  the  endow-
ment  effects  on  the  health  investments  and  fertility  of  the  ith  household.
These  are  given  by
i i  PN  i  i
dX  x  [hi  dX  dX
[h  (-) Si  hi  xx  dp  c  id
dp  x  x  dF
(11) i
dN  x  rhi  .dN l . dN1
Si  hi  xx  L  dp  c  "i dp  x  x  dF
where c denotes compensated effect.11
From expressions  (10) and  (11),  sufficient  (but not necessary)
conditions  for  larger family planning subsidies  to  be provided  to  low-
endowment households  (compensatory subsidization) are  that  (i) fertility
and  health  are  gross substitutes  (dX/dp  <  0,  dN/dp  >  0  (so that dNi/d i >  0)
and  (ii)  dXi/d i >  0;  i.e.,  more endowed households invest  less  in health.
In  that case,  the returns  to  further health investments will be smaller in high-  than
in low-p households and  high-p households will have at least as many averted
births  (at least as  high  family planning subsidy costs) as  low-p households.
Thus, where fertility control  subsidies but not health subsidies are preva-
lent,  fertility and health  investments will likely be gross  substitutes
in  recipient households and  such subsidies will be distributed dis-
proportionately to  the lowest endowment households.
c.  Combining Health and  Family Planning Subsidies
Having shown that family planning subsidies can  effectively substitute
for  health subsidies when there  is  (only) a health externality, under
certain  conditions,  we  now  consider  whether  a  combination  of  health
and  fertility control  subsidies  is redundant,  that  is,  we  consider whether
fertility control  subsidies will be used  in addition to  health subsidies
in the presence of  the health externality and in the absence of a popula-
tion  externality.
The budget constraint  for  the subsidy provider when both subsidies
can be used  is:
(12)  G' =  G  +  . s  (1 +  )  XN
i  x  x
and  the equilibrium conditions for  the  two  subsidy rates are:12
i  i
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s
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As  before,  the  optimal  subsidy  levels  depend  on  price  effects.  However,
in  this  case  both  health  and  family  planning  subsidies  may  be  used
even  if  the  objective  functions  for  the  low-income  households  are  strongly
separable,  no  biological  relationship  exists  between  family  size  and
child  health,and  all  low-income  households  invest  equally  in  child  health.
In  that  case,  the  equilibrium  conditions  are:
i  i
s  i  NX  HH*  HX  i.  i  -1
(15)  =  [1  +  a  -p  . n  ]  (n  )
Px  NX  HX  Xx  x
i
s
or  x-  =  0.
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Expression  (15) indicates that  the health subsidy will be used  as
long as there is a health externality.  Expression (16)  indicates that with
sufficiently high health-subsidy expenditures by the  subsidizing agent,
positive family planning subsidies will also be optimal.  Moreover, family
planning and  health subsidies, where both are used, will be  positively
correlated.  The  complementarity between the  two subsidies, despite  the
single  health externality, arises  from the interaction between family
size and per-child health expenditures in the  "governmental" budget
constraint  (12)--an increase  in the family planning subsidy to household i
which lowers  family size in i by one  child saves  the  subsidizing agent
the amount  s X ; the cost of  that  increase depends positively on the
x
number of births averted by the  ith household  and inversely  on the magnitude
of  its (own) fertility control  elasticity.
When  strictly positive health and  family planning  subsidies are
jointly optimal,  the magnitudes of  the subsidies will also generally
depend on the differing health endowments of  the recipient households.
Moreover, the direction of  the endowment-subsidy association  is  likely
to be identical for  both the family planning and health subsidy.  However,
unlike in the  single-subsidy case, no  simple sufficient condition re-
garding household demand relationships determines the sign of the associa-
tions between the  two subsidies and the health endowments.14
3.  Empirical Application:  Laguna Province,  the Philippines
a.  The  Data and  the Distribution of Government  Facilities
We have shown that the effects of  government interventions on per-
child health within a family are incorrectly estimated  if  the distribu-
tion of  those interventions are influenced by  the health predispositions
of households, associated with endowments or  tastes,  that are unobserved
by the researcher.  In order to  correctly assess  the impact  of government
programs designed  to  influence health outcomes and to  discover the govern-
ment  placement rules, it  is  thus necessary either  to estimate or to
measure pre-program heterogeneity  in health outcomes.  We will attempt  to
obtain consistent estimates of  both the health effects of  governmental
family planning and health facilities and of  facility placement rules based
on longitudinal data describing the distribution of  such public programs
and child health in  20 barrios  (villages) in the lowland  rice-producing
areas of  Laguna Province in the Philippines.  Information from surveys
of  240 randomly-selected households residing  in  these barrios on the  age,
height and weight of every family member was  collected  in 1975 and 1979.
Information was also obtained  in the  1979 survey round on the dates  of
introduction of  rural health clinics, family planning clinics,  and pri-
mary schools financed by the national  government for  each of  the barrios.
The distribution of  the public facilities across barrios is reported
in Table 1.  While all but  two  of  the twenty barrios have a public primary
school, with such schools having been in existence for  at least  fifteen
years prior  to  1979  for each of the other eighteen barrios, health and
family planning  facilities were more recently introduced and are  less prevalent.Table  1
Distribution of Public Facilities in Twenty Laguna Barrios by
Number  of  Years  Instituted  Prior  to  1979
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Seven barrios had  no public health clinic  and eight barrios had  no  family
planning facility by 1979, with seven of  the thirteen  existing health
facilities and eleven of  the twelve family planning facilities introduced
less than fifteen  years prior  to  1979.
The joint distribution of  the family planning and health clinics
appears in conformity with  the health externality model, as  such facilities
appear  to  be placed  in a complementary pattern--the Spearmen rank correla-
tion of  establishment dates for  the family planning and health clinics
is  .62.  Moreover, of  the seven barrios that hadno  health clinic,  five
also did not  have a family planning clinic  and of  the eight barrios without
a family planning clinic,  five also  did not have a health clinic.  Five
barrios had  neither facility as of 1979.  The  existence of  two barrios with-
out a health clinic but with a family planning clinic suggests, as noted,
that  if direct population externalities are ruled out,  child health and
family size should appear  to  be gross  substitutes among the Laguna
households.  This  is  confirmed  below.
b.  Estimation  Framework
To  exploit the  longitudinal data on health and  the information on the
dates of  program initiation, we modify the above framework to accommodate
the realities that  governmemt programs are initiated at  different times
and that observed child health  in any period  is a stock variable influenced
by resources allocated in the current  and  prior periods.  The  impact of a
program on the current health status of  a particular child will  thus depend
upon the  length of  its previous exposure to  the program.  We will exploit
the variability in program exposure across children to  estimate the effects
of  the health and family planning programs and  to  estimate the barrio-specific
health endowments.  Variation in program exposure across children, however,16
occurs both because barrios differ  in  the timing of program introduction
and because children within the barrio differ  in their dates of birth.
If  child health investments differ systematically by the birthdate of  the
child due  to health-related  factors about which the researcher  is unaware,
a spurious relationship between child health and program exposure is
generated even  if  the timing of government programs  across barrios is
unrelated  to  family  or  barrio  endowments.
Let  t  represent  the year of  the survey, t  the year  the program
s  p
was instituted,  and  tb the  year  of  birth  of  a  child.  The  program  will  have
been in effect  t  - t  years  and  for children  born  prior  to  t  , i.e.,
s  p  p
t b  <  tp  t  - t  will be the number  of years  each such child will have been
b  p  s  p
exposed.  Yet, a child born one year prior  to  the program will  likely be more
strongly  impacted by the program than a child born five years  prior to  the
program.  We  thus adopt  as a measure of program exposure the fraction of a
child's lifetime during which  the child was exposed  to  the program.  Let
a
P  be  the  program  exposure  of  child  i  residing  in  barrio  k  who  is  of  age  a
at  the survey date, where a  =  t  - tb.  Thus,
a
Pp  =  0 if  the  program does not  exist  in the barrio as of  the survey date
t  - t
=  s   if  t  > t  > tb  in barrio k
a  s - p  b
=  1  if  t  > t  > t  in barrio R.
s  b-  p
Consider the  following child health demand equation  for a  child i
aged  a in barrio  £ observed at  t  :
s
a  a
(17)  H  =  Pi  B +  u i  +  +  it  '
s  s17
where  H  is  an  age-standardized  measure  of  health,  u.  is  a  time-invariant, 1
child-specific  health  endowment,  the  P  are  location-specific  health
factors  and  c  is  a  random  error  term.  Least  squares  estimation  of  (17)
when  P  is  unobserved  leads  to  a  biased  estimate  of  8,  the  program  exposure
effect,  if  t  ,  the  date  the  program  was  introduced,  is  related  to  the  area's
endowments,  as  would  be  the  case  with  non-random  program  placement.
Within-family  or  barrio  estimators  of  B,  which  purge  out,  respectively,  household
and  locational  characteristics,  are also  biased,  however,  even  if  program
placement  is  uncorrelated with child or  family-specific endowments u if  child-
specific  health  endowments  (within-family)  or  household  endowments  (within-
barrio)  influence  the  spacing  of  children.  In  differenced  form,  for  a  family  with
at  least  one  child  born  prior  to  the  program's  introduction,  the  within-family
estimator  is:
S-  Ha  (t  - t  )  (tb  - tb)
(18)  H  - H  +(u  u)+  (C
j t   i t  =(t  - tb  )  (t  - tb)  j  i  jt  it
where  a'  =  t  - tb,  >  a.  As  can  be  seen,  even  if  the  dates  of  program
introduction  t  are  independent  of  the  child-specific  error  u,  if  child  j's
birth  date  tb,  is  related  to  his/her  older  siblings'  health  status  u.
b  i
the within-family  estimate  of  the  program  exposure  effect  is
also  biased.  In  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1984)  and  Rosenzweig  (forthcoming)
it  is  shown  that  birth  spacing  and  other  child-specific  inputs  are  significantly
correlated  with  prior  sibling  and  family-specific  endowments,  leading  to  biased
estimates
/of  child-specific  resource  allocations.  Thus,  as  long  as  program  placement
is  not  responsive  to  purely  random  disturbances  (or  perturbations  with
little  persistence),  only  within-child  estimators  will  yield  consistent
estimates  of  the  effect  of  program  exposure,  given  systematic  program  place-
4
ment  and  endowment-conditioned  birth  spacing  behavior.  Longitudinal  information
on  child health  outcomes  is  required.18
c.  Program Assessment:  Comparisons of  Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates
To estimate the effects  of  the  facilities on child health, we selected a
sample of children  (defined to  be under eighteen as of  1979)  for whom height
and weight information exists in both years of  the Laguna survey, yielding
a  working  sample  of  274  children  in  eighty-five  households.  Table  2  provides
descriptive statistics  for  the  sample children at each of  the  two survey dates.
Height and weight are  standardized by age and sex according to  a national
schedule.  The average child  in  this  sample in each of  the  two survey years
is  somewhat over  ninety percent  as  tall  as the average  Filipino  child of
the  same  age  and  sex  but  only  a  little  over  eighty  percent  as  heavy.  However,
the  average  child  in  the  sample  has  evidently  grown  slightly  in  both  dimen-
sions relative to  the  standard between the two surveys.
Three  separate specifications were  estimated corresponding  to alter-
native  assumptions  about  unobservables  in  the  determination  of  height  and
weight.  In  the  first  two  colunns  of  Table  3  ordinary  least  squares  regres-
sions are reported using  the 1979 cross-section of  274  children.  The second
pair  of columns repeats the cross-sectional regressions but adds barrio
dummy variables.  The  third set of columns  reports  first-differenced re-
gressions using the 1979 and 1975  (matched) samples.  The first column
of  each  set  includes  the  child's  exposure  to  primary  schools  in  addition
to  exposure to  the health  and family planning clinics.  In the upper half
of  the table  the dependent variable is  the log of standardized height;  in
the lower half the  dependent variable  is  the  log of standardized weight.
The differences  in estimated program exposure effects across the
specifications are striking for either health measure.  In the height
regressions,  both the  cross-section and barrio  fixed-effect health andTable  2
Sample  Statistics
Variable  Mean  S.D.
Natural logarithm of height normalized by Philippines age
standard,  1975
Natural logarithm of height normalized by Philippines age
standard,  1979
Natural logarithm of weight normalized by Philippines age
standard,  1975
Natural logarithm of weight normalized by Philippines age
standard, 1979
Exposure to public health unit, fraction of years, 1975
Exposure to public health unit, fraction of years, 1979
Exposute to family planning clinic, fraction of years, 1975
Exposure to family planning clinic, fraction of years, 1979
Exposure to public primary school, fraction of years, 1975
Exposure to  public primary  school,  fraction  of  years,  1979
Number  of  years  rural  health  in  barrio,  1979
Number  of  years  family  planning  clinic in  barrio,  1979
Number of years  public  primary  school  in  barrio,  1979
Number of barrios




























Estimates  of the Effects  of Exposure to Governmental Programs
on the Standardized Height and Weight of  Children
OLS  Fixed-Effect  Fixed-Effect
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Public  Primary  School
Exposure
F
Log  of Standardized  Height
-.00976  -.00473  .00950  -.0205  .0507
(1.04)  (0.53)  (0.16)  (0.40)  (1.58)
-.00605  -.0131  -.0135  -.00913  .0709
(0.49)  (1.12)  (0.40)  (0.27)  (3.31)
-. 0193  - -.172  - (.0569






















































aEquation also  includes
From  first-differenced
the  age and educational attainment of each parent.
equation.19
family planning clinic  "effects" are generally negative with standard errors
that are  at  least as  large as the  point estimates.  The child fixed-effect
(longitudinal) estimates, however,  indicate  that exposure to health and
family planning clinics increases height, with the family planning effect
statistically significant  at  the usual confidence levels and  the health
clinic effect marginally significant.  The point estimates  indicate that
the height of a child  for whom no  health clinic existed would be five  per-
cent below that  for a child  always exposed  to a clinic, while exposure  to
a family planning clinic  increases height by seven percent.  The same pattern
emerges  for public primary schools,although in that case  the child fixed-
effect point estimate has a very large standard error,  due most likely
to  the small variance  in exposure associated with the longevity of  public
schools  displayed  in  Table  1.
The weight regressions tell a very similar  story:  the cross-section
and within-barrio associations between health clinic  exposure  and  age-
standardized weight are negative, while  the child  fixed effect  estimates,
measured relatively precisely, indicate that  exposure  to  either  the health
or  family planning programs  increases the weight-for-age  of children.  Here,
however, the family planning effect  is  somewhat more robust  to  specification,
although  the effect of this program on child weight is  underestimated by
more than 100 percent when only the cross-sectional variation  in program
placement  is utilized.  The point  estimates  (last column) indicate  that
unit increases in health and  family planning clinic  exposure  increase age-
standardized child weight by nine and  twelve percent respectively.
d.  Program Placement Rules
Whether  child health status  is measured by age-standardized height or20
weight,  the estimates of  the child health effects of  the family planning
program purged of contamination by  the endogeneity of  program placement
or birth-spacing  in Table  3 indicate  that  child health and  family size are
substitutes--subsidies  to  fertility control evidently augment resource
allocations  to  child health investment  among Laguna households.  Thus, as
we have shown, family planning clinics may substitute  for health clinics
in the presence of health externalities and/or may effectively complement
health clinics even  in the absence  of  other externalities, due  to  the
interaction between  family size  and health investments  in  the "governmental"
budget  constraint.
In this  section we seek to  discern whether  the dates of  introduction
of  both the health and  family planning clinics are  systematically related
to  the average  child health endowment within a barrio,  i.e.,  we estimate
the  governmental program allocation rules.  The child-specific  effects
that are estimated  from (17)  contain the elements u.,  ~  ,  a constant,
and  the  effects of all  time-invariant determinants of height and
weight, e.g.,  mother's schooling, but net  out  the effects of  the programs.
However,  since there are only two observations on each child,  the estimated
fixed  effect measures  the true pre-program child effect with error.  Averaging
child-specific effects within each barrio thus  yields a measure  (gross of
time-invariant  factors and  random errors)  of pre-program barrio level
health presumably observed by the  government,  though only indirectly by
us,  and used by  it  to plan the timing of public program introduction.
We have two  such measures, corresponding to height and to weight.
Table  4 reports the estimates of  the impact of the average barrio-level
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time  in years  that each of three programs--health  clinics, family plan-
ning clinics, primary  schools--have been  in existence  in the barrio.  There
are  thus twenty observations.  Parental education  levels were  intially in-
cluded as  discussed above, but were jointly insignificant  at conventional
levels and  so are excluded from the results actually presented.  The first
row uses actual mean height  in the barrio and would only be correct  if the
programs  themselves had  no impact on height.  The second row uses the
barrio-average  fixed-effect computed  from the  child  fixed-effect height
regression reported  in column 6 of  Table 3.  The  third row uses  the pre-
dicted height fixed-effect  obtained from a first stage regression in which
the  (in)  height  fixed-effect  is  regressed on the  (in)  weight  fixed-effect,
computed from the  last column estimates  of Table  3.  The purpose of  this
latter procedure  is  to  purge  the estimate of  the height fixed effeqt of
measurement  error under the assumption that height and weight are both
measures of the  same underlying health  indicator.5
While  the timing of  program initiation for  all  three  programs appears
unrelated  to  average  child height in the  barrios  (row one),  when the
height effects of the  three programs are removed, as  in rows two  and  three,
the estimates  indicate  that  the health and  family planning clinics were
distributed systematically over time  and, as expected, were allocated in a
similar manner.  Moreover, the statistically significant, fixed effect
estimates  imply a compensatory government allocation rule for
both of  the evidently complementary health programs.  Barrios with
lower  pre-program health "endowments" evidently received both types of
health-augmenting programs earlier.  The  timing of  primary public school
placement is not significantly related to  the health endowments, however,
a result consistent with our finding that such schools do not appear to
significantly affect child health.22
The point estimates  based on the  predicted height measure indicate
that where pre-program standardized height was one percent higher  (about
one-fourth of the  standard deviation) the introduction of  a health unit
was retarded by about  two years.  The distribution of family planning
clinics was almost as responsive  to health endowment variation;  their
introduction was delayed by about one and one-half years for every per-
centage increase in standardized height.  The compensatory program place-
ment rule followed by the governmental authorities  for  the complementary
health and  family planning programs thus appears  to  have been responsible
for  the significant negative biases observed  in the cross-sectional
estimates  of  the  effects of  the two programs  in Table 3.
3.  Conclusion
In this paper we have specified and tested a model of  the distri-
bution by a central authority of  family planning and  child health investment
subsidies across heterogenous  localities and  assessed the  bias  in  the
evaluations of  such programs based  on cross-sectional  data implied  by
non-random program distribution.  A basic feature of  the model is  the
presence of a health externality, which is  shown  to be sufficient  along
with plausible features of  household behavior to make selective subsi-
dization of  fertility control either alone or  in  combination with health
investment  subsidies Pareto-efficient.  Thus the  issue of whether or
not population growth per  se impedes economic  development, whether  there
are direct population externalities,may be irrelevant  to  the  issue of whether
family planning programs are  desirable intruments for promoting economic
growth.23
The model suggests  that subsidization of  fertility control  is  likely
to be Pareto  efficient  in the presence of  health or human capital exter-
nalities when a) human capital and  family size are gross  substitutes
and/or b) any per-child human capital subsidies are provided  to recipient
households.  In  the  first case,  fertility control  subsidies may substitute
for direct  subsidies  to  health investment  and an equalizing distribution
of  the subsidies,  the highest family planning subsidies  to  the lowest-
health recipient  households,  is  efficient.When both family planning and
and  health subsidies are used,  fertility control  subsidies serve to
minimize the  subsidy burden  for donors and will be highest where total
subsidy expenditures per  child are  greatest,  but in general the ordering
of  the distribution of  the joint subsidies by the inherent healthiness
of  recipients  cannot  be  predicted.
Longitudinal data describing the timing of  program implementation
in twenty randomly-sampled  barrios in the Laguna Province in  the Philippines
revealed a systematic  pattern of  health and  family planning program
placement  in accord with the model:  each program was  initiated  earliest
in the low-health barrios, most  of  the barrios  that  had  any program had
both programs by the date of  the  last  survey round, and when endogenous
program placement was  taken into account,  exposure to  either program ap-
peared  to  significantly improve  children's health status.  Family size
and  child health thus appeared  to be  gross substitutes in the Laguna
households,  a sufficient  condition for the  presence of some barrios
with a family planning,but not  a health, clinic.
The  compensatory pattern of program placement, when not  taken into
account, yielded estimates of  the effects of the two programs on child
health thatwould have led to  false rejection of  the  hypothesis that24
either or  both improved  child health.  Those results thus imply that
conclusions drawn from studies exploiting the cross-sectional variation
in program intensities  to evaluate programs and/or to  identify structural
relationships characterizing household behavior should be  interpreted
with care.  Additional empirical  and theoretical work integrating cen-
tral and local program determination with household optimization would appear
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1.  Given technological advances  in contraceptive technology, a rationale for  the
public dissemination of  general contraceptive  information may be warranted.
However,  this does not necessarily justify subsidization of  contraceptive
devices  or of  person-specific contraceptive  services.  Moreover,  as low-
fertility households gain most from the acquisition of contraceptive
information, disproportionate  information provision to such households
would appear  to be  implied by interest  group  theory.
2.  We  assume that households do not move across localities.  The conse-
quences of  the selective migration of  agents  in response to  changes in
local programs are considered in Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1984b).
3.  The evidence on  the biological effect  of  family size or birth order
on child  health suggests  that such a linkage provides  little justifi-
cation  for  subsidization  of  fertility  control  on  health  grounds.  In
Rosenzweig and  Schultz  (1983),  birthweight  is  found to  significantly
increase  with increasing birth order;  in  Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1984a),
little or  not relationship  is  found between birth order and birthweight,
although  longer  (prior) birth  intervals increase  birthweight.  Both of
these studies take into account  in estimation the existence of  hetero-
geneity  in health endowments.
4.  Indeed,  it  is not  necessarily  true that  the within-barrio regression
performs better  than the cross-section regression if  the within-child
regression is  taken to be  the correctly specified model.
5.  The results  reported in Table 4  are qualitatively identical when the
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